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Herman Belz* 
On the occasion of this journal's tenth anniversary, readers 
may find profit in recalling two seminal essays on the American 
Constitution that may be thought of as providing an intellectual 
provenance for the kind of scholarship that Constitutional Com-
mentary seeks to encourage. In 1934, in the midst of the Great 
Depression, Karl Llewellyn and Edward S. Corwin, two leading 
representatives of legal liberalism, assayed the nature and ten-
dency of American constitutionalism. Llewellyn, writing with the 
explicit intent of laying "the foundation for an intelligent recon-
struction of our constitutional law theory," offered an empirical 
description of the Constitution that can be regarded as a possible 
model for the study of constitutional history.l Corwin, writing as 
a historian of the Supreme Court and constitutional law, relied 
on theory to explain the significance of the New Deal for the 
constitutional order. Although approaching their subject from 
the differing standpoints of theory and history respectively, each 
scholar's account implicated the other's discipline. 
The purpose of the present essay is to consider historical and 
theoretical perspectives in writing about the Constitution. It is 
intended to be exploratory and suggestive, continuing in a mod-
est way a scholarly inquiry begun over two decades ago by 
Charles A. Miller in his illuminating study, The Supreme Court 
and the Uses of History.z To rely on history in constitutional ad-
judication raises a question about historiographical method. As 
Miller noted, it also poses a problem in legal theory.3 Miller's 
interest in the problem was provoked in part by changes in race 
relations in the 1960s, which constituted a chasm in history and 
required major revision in constitutional law and theory.4 Since 
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then a revival of interest in original intent jurisprudence has oc-
curred that has stimulated further consideration of the role of 
history in constitutional and legal theory. At the same time, the 
historical profession has responded to political and social change, 
including specific developments in constitutional law, by becom-
ing increasingly sensitive to normative and theoretical concerns.s 
Part I of this essay will briefly review Llewellyn's and 
Corwin's analyses of the Constitution, which have intrinsic his-
torical importance and are worthy of reflection and contempla-
tion. Parts II and III of the essay will then examine some recent 
writing in constitutional history and theory, illustrating the ten-
dency toward reciprocal involvement of each field in the other's 
disciplinary metier. While the inquiry seeks to clarify the nature 
of the knowledge and understanding of the Constitution which 
Americans require to carry on their political life, its approach is 
mainly that of historical description. 
I 
Rejecting the orthodox view that written and unwritten con-
stitutions were fundamentally different in nature, Karl Llewellyn 
argued that the United States Constitution was "in essence not a 
document, but a living institution built (historically, genetically) 
in first instance around a particular Document."6 The United 
States, he said, had "the sort of constitution loosely designated as 
'unwritten.' "7 It consisted of existing political, governmental, 
and legal institutions and practices, and operated through the 
agency of "specialists in governing," "interested groups," and the 
"general public."s Llewellyn acknowledged that the constitu-
tional text had "a little influence," but only "[w]here it makes no 
important difference which way the decision goes. "9 The "first 
principle of a sane theory of our constitutional law," he asserted, 
was that "[w]herever there are today established practices 
'under' or 'in accordance with' the Document, it is only the prac-
5. Michael Kammen, ed., The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in 
the United States 19-46 (Cornell U. Press, 1980), and Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: 
The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession (Cambridge U. Press, 
1988). 
6. Llewellyn, 34 Colum. L. Rev. at 3 (cited in note 1). 
7. Id. at 2 n.5. Llewellyn acknowledged earlier writers who questioned the theory 
of the written Constitution, including Arthur F. Bentley and Howard L. McBain. For 
discussion, see Herman Belz, The Realist Critique of Constitutionalism in the Era of Re-
form, 15 Am. J. Legal Hist. 288 (1971). 
8. Llewellyn, 34 Colum. L. Rev. at 19 (cited in note 1). 
9. Id. at 39 (emphasis in original). 
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tice which can legitimize the words as still being part of our going 
Constitution. It is not the words which legitimize the practice."to 
If governmental practice without reference to the document 
was the standard of constitutional legitimacy, what then became 
of the Constitution as a fundamental law limiting government? 
Where was the line to be drawn defining principles and institu-
tions basic to the whole? Llewellyn recognized the problem, but 
it is hard to see how he provided a satisfactory answer. Neither 
in his empirical description nor in his theory were there clear 
lines, limits or boundaries distinguishing the "working constitu-
tion" from "mere working government." Llewellyn wrote: 
"[w]hatever one takes as being this working Constitution, he will 
find the edges of his chosen material not sharp, but penumbra-
like. And the penumbra will of necessity be in constant flux. "u 
When questions arose in "the penumbra-border of the Constitu-
tion" as to whether a change should be approved, recourse could 
not be had to a definite institution because none was definite on 
the point at issue. "The appeal must therefore be ... to a norma-
tive ideal of what the institution in question should be and do," 
Llewellyn reasoned.IZ In like manner, explaining how the Con-
stitution restrained the power of government officials, he said it 
was "the job of the [Supreme] Court ... to control the course of 
governmental practice by reference to an ideal not found in that 
practice, but in the nature of what our government should be."B 
To rely on "the language of the Document and its 'intent'" as a 
standard for constitutional interpretation, Llewellyn concluded, 
in contrast to the "development-tendency of existing and forma-
tive practice," was to "offer a basis utterly self-inconsistent, un-
workable, and heavy with the fragrance of a charnel-house."t4 
Edward S. Corwin presented a similar assessment of the ten-
dency of American constitutionalism. Analyzing the National In-
dustrial Recovery Act as the cynosure of the New Deal, Corwin 
described the Act as "declaratory ... of certain legal principles 
which it is hoped will prove to be adapted to the present eco-
nomic situation of the United States." But the principles in this 
"declaratory statute" were not in the Constitution, or at least 
they received little illumination from the twenty or so words in 
the text that Corwin said had any bearing on the subject. "The 
10. Id. at 12 (emphasis in original). 
11. Id. at 26. 
12. Id. at 28 (emphasis in original). 
13. Id. at 39 (emphasis in original). 
14. Id. at 28. 
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problem," he observed, "is one rather of Constitutional law and 
theory."1s 
Corwin stated that the N.I.R.A. rested on the theory of "the 
solidarity of American business" and the power of Congress to 
regulate "the whole business structure." It was not based on the 
Commerce Clause, which limited congressional power to com-
merce among the states, nor on the traditional theory that the 
national government had only the powers clearly delegated to it. 
To justify the statute in constitutional theory, Corwin invoked 
history. He argued that the commerce power in fact had never 
been confined to regulating acts of commerce among the states, 
but extended to noncommercial matters insofar as it included the 
safeguarding of commerce. A major effect of the N.I.R.A., a 
form of centralized economic regulation, was to destroy the fed-
eral system by driving the states from the field of economic regu-
lation or subordinating their powers to the supreme power of 
Congress. Again Corwin's justification of this doctrinal develop-
ment was historical: "in the field of business relations state power 
has long been moribund, so that the N.I.R.A. simply recognizes 
and gives effect to a Constitutional theory which is the counter-
part of a condition already long established in the facts of our 
everyday economic life."16 
In Corwin's view, the New Deal signified a revolution in the 
understanding of the basic constitutional principles of federalism, 
judicial review, and the separation of powers.11 Underlying these 
theoretical changes, and linking his analysis both to Llewellyn's 
assessment and to constitutional theory a half century later, was 
Corwin's untroubled assumption that "the Constitution of the 
United States can accommodate itself to the revolution which the 
N.I.R.A. undoubtedly does spell." Ultimately Corwin perceived 
"a change in the character of the Constitution itself." In this he 
saw a historical parallel between English and American constitu-
tionalism. In 1400 Magna Charta was the English Constitution in 
great part, yet by 1700 that document "had been absorbed into a 
vast complexus of environing institutions." The same thing was 
now happening to the American Constitution. The Constitution, 
15. Edward S. Corwin, Some Probable Repercussions of "Nira" on Our Constitu-
tional System, 172 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 139, 139-40 (1934). 
16. Id. at 140-41. 
17. Corwin said that although the end of the federal-state balance removed a major 
rationale for judicial intervention in national policy making, judicial review would con-
tinue "in behalf of the helpless and oppressed against local injustice and prejudice." He 
also predicted that fusion of powers and cooperation among the branches of government 
would supersede the ideas of separation and competition on which the constitutional sys-
tem was originally based. ld. at 142. 
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Corwin reasoned, would become absorbed into the governmental 
revolution that the New Deal augured, and Americans' attitude 
toward the Constitution "will consequently become less legalistic 
and more political. We shall value it for the aid it lends to con-
sidered social purpose, not as a lawyers' document." Corwin 
thus described a transforming historical development with far-
reaching theoretical consequences.1s 
Corwin and Llewellyn implicate history in the broadest 
sense in their view of momentous political and social change sig-
naling the decline of legal-formalist constitutionalism and the ad-
vent of the unwritten constitution as a conceptual framework of 
American government. Consisting of existing governmental in-
stitutions and practices shaped by social forces, the unwritten 
constitution represented the historicization of the constitutional 
text. As a theoretical construct, it explained what happens to a 
charter of fundamental law under the ravages of time. The Con-
stitution becomes, in the characterization later employed by 
Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, "a stream of history."I9 
To know and understand what the constitution is, therefore, re-
quires historical inquiry, and a different type of inquiry from that 
associated with a written constitution. The latter entails an un-
derstanding of history as discrete events and the objective, imma-
nent meaning and intent of specific actions and decisions. 
Unwritten, political constitutionalism, in contrast, depends upon 
a concept of history as ongoing process, growth, and 
development.2o 
As constitutional theory implicates history, so any account 
of constitutional history rests on certain theoretical assumptions. 
In order to decide what kind of evidence to consult, it is neces-
sary to have in mind an idea of the nature and scope of the Con-
stitution, or what constitutes it. Furthermore, the purpose of 
constitutional history, like any other historical inquiry, may in-
volve normative concerns raising questions of political theory 
and moral philosophy. Concerned as it is with knowledge of past 
decisions and actions that may have a direct bearing on questions 
of policy, constitutional history may be more subject to norma-
tive-theoretical demands than scholarship in fields that have less 
immediate practical import. 
18. Id. at 144. 
19. Quoted in Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 33 (Princeton U. Press, 1988). 
20. Miller, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History at 25-26, 191-92 (cited in note 
2). 
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Rereading the essays of Llewellyn and Corwin half a century 
later naturally invites reflection on the accuracy of their assess-
ment of American constitutionalism. Do they offer, in essence, a 
prolegomenon to contemporary constitutional scholarship? 
In many respects Corwin and Llewellyn appear as far-
sighted, perspicacious observers. A generation after they de-
scribed the triumph of political constitutionalism over declara-
tory jurisprudence and legal formalism, public law scholars 
generally accepted political jurisprudence in theoretical and em-
pirical terms.21 Even the process jurisprudence of the 1940s and 
1950s, which was a reaction to legal realism, conceded the sub-
stantially political nature of constitutional adjudication.22 Since 
Corwin and Llewellyn wrote, moreover, several scholars have 
elaborated the concept of an unwritten constitution in explaining 
the nature of American constitutionalism.23 And it seems unnec-
essary to add that the project of reconstructing constitutional the-
ory, initiated especially by Llewellyn with his prescient reference 
to penumbras in constant flux, has flourished in recent years as 
legal commentators try to rationalize the expansion of judicial 
policy-making.24 
Yet there is evidence that legal-formalist constitutionalism, 
which Llewellyn and Corwin considered to be historically ex-
hausted, has not only persisted in the post-New Deal era, but has 
experienced something of a revivat.2s Perhaps the clearest indi-
cation of formalist survival is the aggrandizement of constitu-
tional law as an instrument of judicial governance. One can 
assume of course that despite formal appearances all constitu-
tional adjudication is politically willful and subjective. But then 
it becomes necessary to ask why legal-juridical forms must be 
21. Sotirios A. Barber, Normative Theory, the 'New Institutionalism,' and the Future 
of Public Law, 3 Stud. Amer. Pol. Dev. 56, 57 (1989). 
22. G. Edward White, The American Judicial Tradition (Oxford U. Press, 1976). 
23. Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 703 
(1975); Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in 
American Revolutionary Thought, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 843 (1978); Stephen R. Munzer and 
James W. Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 
1029 (1977); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
1127 (1987); Michael Zuckert, Epistemology and Hermeneutics in the Constitutional Juris· 
prudence of John Marshall, in Thomas C. Shevory, ed., John Marshall's Achievement: 
Law, Politics, and Constitutional Interpretations 202-15 (Greenwood Press, 1989); Robert 
F. Nagel, Constitutional Cultures: The Mentality and Consequences of Judicial Review 1-26 
(U. of Cal. Press, 1989) ("Constitutional Cultures"). 
24. See, for example, Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate (Oxford U. Press, 1982); 
Sotirios A. Barber, On What The Constitution Means (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1984); 
Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Belknap Press, 1986); Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial 
Constitution (Harv. U. Press, 1993). 
25. See Nagel, Constitutional Cultures at 121-55 (cited in note 23). 
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maintained. Why does not the Supreme Court candidly acknowl-
edge, for example, that its decisions are based on an unwritten 
constitution and laws when, in the opinion of many scholars, this 
is so obviously the case?26 Perhaps the reason is that principles, 
forms and procedures are essential elements of constitutionalism. 
Accordingly the formal, written Constitution continues to have 
great practical importance in shaping the course of American 
political life.27 
The resuscitation of original intent thinking, which began in 
the 1970s, occurred when it did because of substantive objections 
in the society to many Supreme Court decisions in the previous 
decade. The reasons why it occurred, however, concern the very 
nature of constitutional government in the United States. In the 
deepest sense the concept of Framers' intent as an approach to 
constitutional adjudication, and the corollary interpretive 
method of textualism, reflects the fact that the American Consti-
tution is not simply or primarily an ongoing historical process. It 
is a written document, adopted at a particular point in history 
(and subsequently amended), that signifies political action and 
purpose of the most fundamental sort, namely, the founding of a 
regime. Critics of original intent, citing epistemological and 
other difficulties, labor mightily to discount if not dismiss the 
solid grounding in empirical fact on which this approach to con-
stitutional decision-making rests. They labor in vain, however, 
because the history of the making of the Constitution, abun-
dantly documented despite inevitable lacunae, prevents it from 
being dissolved into some immemorial past-or transformed into 
an assemblage of existing political institutions and practices. 
Writing before the revival of original intent jurisprudence, 
Charles Miller observed: 
Neither the clinical destruction of the Court's use of history 
through legal scholarship nor outright advocacy of forward-
looking decisions has been able to tear up traditions of consti-
tutional and judicial thinking deeply rooted in the American 
political culture. The ties of the Constitution are to the past, 
and when history calls the justices strain to listen.zs 
26. Leslie Friedman Goldstein, In Defense of the Text: Democracy and Constitu-
tional Theory 67 (Rowman & Littlefield, 1991) ("In Defense of the Text"). 
27. Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., America's Constitutional Soul (Johns Hopkins U. 
Press, 1991). 
28. Miller, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History at 51 (cited in note 2). 
Miller's reference to an attempted destruction of judicial reliance on history is a reference 
to Jacobus ten Broek, Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Consti-
tutional Construction, 26 and 27 Cal. L. Rev. 437, 664 (1938) and 157, 399 (1939). 
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A generation later Paul Kahn, surveying the history of constitu-
tional theory, made the same point in stating that constitutional 
law is a historical enterprise: "In recognizing its authority, citi-
zens recognize the continuity of the past with the present. In re-
specting the Constitution as law, they respect the authority of 
past political acts over present community preferences."29 
If Llewellyn and Corwin failed to appreciate the necessity 
and enduring appeal of legal-formalist elements in the regime, 
their analyses are nevertheless instructive for the reflection they 
provoke on history and theory in constitutional interpretation. 
Both historical knowledge of the purpose of the Constitution, 
and theoretical understanding of basic constitutional principles, 
are essential to maintaining the American regime as a lawful sys-
tem of government. History and theory as separate disciplines 
contribute to constitutional maintenance. Yet the question of the 
scope and precise limits of the two fields warrants further investi-
gation. A review of some recent writings on the Constitution sug-
gests a more complicated interdisciplinary tendency in which 
practitioners in each field employ the methods and engage some 
of the concerns of the other. 
II 
History is usually thought of as a nontheoretical inquiry, in 
comparison with philosophy, law, and political science, all of 
which it is allied with in constitutional scholarship. Historians 
like to talk about evidence and methods; they regard theory as 
speculative and hypothetical. This restraint is warranted, for the-
ory is difficult to define and hard to know how to use in a disci-
plined way. Theory can refer to systematically organized 
knowledge that is applicable in a variety of circumstances, to a 
set of assumptions, principles, and rules of procedure devised to 
analyze, predict, or explain the nature or behavior of a set of 
phenomena, or simply to abstract reasoning and speculation. As 
used in public law scholarship, theory has a decidedly normative 
connotation. It expresses opinion and belief about what the 
Constitution and the laws ought to be, rather than empirical de-
scription of what they are or were in the past. Indeed, contempo-
rary legal commentary has been described as pervasively 
29. Paul W. Kahn, Legitimacy and History: Self-Government in American Constitu-
tional Theory 189 (Yale U. Press, 1992) ("Legitimacy and History"). 
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normative in the sense of being grounded in various conceptions 
of justice.3o 
History that aims at an objective factual account of past 
events is often considered to be untheoretical antiquarianism.3t 
Yet in a strict sense any type of historical inquiry rests on theo-
retical assumptions. In his attack on original intent historicism, 
Jacobus ten Broek noted that the historical approach rests on 
logic, or theory. It assumes that the intent of a constitutional 
provision can be discovered by identifying matters that de-
manded treatment by constitution makers, on the theory that 
ideas which were part of the climate of opinion or which resulted 
from current problems must have been in the minds of the au-
thors of the text.32 The purpose of inquiries into legal history, 
moreover, is often to resolve contemporary legal controversies. 
William Nelson, a liberal legal historian, has argued that 
conservative original intent scholars on the one hand and radical 
devotees of critical legal studies on the other use history to re-
solve present problems.33 Yet if liberal historians have been un-
successful in illuminating legal policy questions, it has not been 
for want of trying. A glance at recent legal historiography sug-
gests that liberal scholars, no less than other historians, have 
been theoretically inclined in the sense of joining history with 
normative philosophical considerations to help solve current 
problems. 
The tradition of external legal history, defined in relation to 
social and economic forces rather than the formal doctrines of 
internal legal history, is self-consciously instrumental. James Wil-
lard Hurst, the founder of law-and-society historiography, took 
for granted the reformist ends of social science and legal realism 
in the 1930s in his effort to re-direct legal history away from tech-
nical professional concerns. Hurst viewed law as a social institu-
tion, an instrument of individual, group, and community purpose 
rather than a self-contained body of autonomous principles and 
rules. Hurstian legal history aimed at measuring the actual past 
performance of government against man's potential for rational 
control of his environment and decision-making. It provided a 
30. Peter H. Schuck, Public Law Litigation and Social Reform, 102 Yale L.J. 1763, 
1764 (1993) (book review). 
31. William M. Wiecek, The Constitutional Snipe Hunt, 23 Rutgers L.J. 253, 254 
(1992). 
32. ten Broek, 26 Cal. L. Rev. at 677 (cited in note 28). ten Broek denied that facts 
now apparent can be assumed to have presented themselves to the framers of a constitu· 
lion in the same light and with the same force as they now appear to a historical observer. 
33. William E. Nelson, New Directions in American Legal History, 4 Benchmark 
283, 284-86 (1990). 
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standard by which the present generation of lawyers could deter-
mine the circumstances that best promoted the intelligent direc-
tion of society in favor of growth.34 
Normative moral ends were more explicitly avowed in Paul 
Murphy's appeal in the early 1960s to historians to reclaim the 
field of constitutional history from lawyers and political scien-
tists. Issuing a kind of liberal manifesto for the era of judicial 
activism that was then beginning, Murphy advocated the use of 
history to promote social change. The theoretical basis of the 
project he envisioned was the assumption that the judicial func-
tion tends naturally to historical study to discover the precise lo-
cus of constitutional language, and to ascertain its thrust, 
implications, and over-all justification. Murphy proposed a "new 
role" for constitutional history "as an auxiliary tool for the jurist, 
not for 'the consecration of an already established order of 
things,' but for a new order seeking a new level of equal rights 
and social justice through law."35 
In the 1970s radical historians, updating the theory of legal 
realism, began to challenge the normative perspective of liberal 
legal history. To proponents of critical legal studies, the work of 
the Hurst school appeared as pragmatic functionalism signifying 
political acceptance of the existing order. In an early statement 
of the radical argument, Morton Horwitz asserted that legal his-
tory should no longer be content with justifying the world as it is, 
but should penetrate the distinction between law and politics. It 
should view jurisprudential change as the product of social forces 
and political struggle.36 In more mature form this argument be-
came an explicit plea for historians to take up questions of legal 
and political theory. According to Horwitz, legal theory inevita-
bly uses history to show how existing arrangements were created 
and legitimized. By the same token, historical interpretation 
serves as a proxy for more general controversies over political 
theory. When, for example, historians argue over whether liber-
alism or republicanism was the ideology of the American 
Revolution, they are really debating the primacy of politics and 
substantive visions of the good society. "It is time for us to 
34. James Willard Hurst, Legal History: A Research Program, 1942 Wis. L. Rev. 323, 
323-33; James Willard Hurst, Law and Social Process in United States History 1-15 (U. of 
Mich. Law School, 1960); Robert W. Gordon, J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law 
Tradition in American Legal Historiography, 10 Law & Soc. Rev. 9, 48 (1975). 
35. Paul L. Murphy, Time to Reclaim: The Current Challenge of American Constitu-
tional History, 69 Am. Hist. Rev. 64, 74-77 (1963). 
36. Morton J. Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal 
History, 17 Am. J. Legal Hist. 275, 281 (1973). 
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bridge the chasm between legal theory and legal history," Hor-
witz urges.37 
Robert Gordon contends that history in general liberates the 
political imagination by revealing suppressed alternatives, and 
radical history discloses the fact that the rule of law is really "a 
teeming jungle of plural, contradictory, orders struggling for rec-
ognition and dominance." In the politics of radical reformation, 
the role of history is "to describe as concretely as possible how 
constraints upon freedom get socially manufactured and how 
people acting collectively through politics sometimes succeed and 
sometimes fail in breaking through the constraints."3s According 
to Gordon, radical legal history teaches the "political lesson" that 
there exist, "immanent in such familiar ideals and institutions as 
private property and free contract, possibilities for transforming 
the society and economy in more democratic and egalitarian ... 
directions. "39 
The result of uniting history and theory can be seen in the 
Bicentennial symposium of the Organization of American His-
torians. Repudiating the traditional concern of constitutional 
history with constitutional maintenance, the symposium authors 
build their accounts around the idea of constitutional aspiration 
popular among legal theorists. Undertaking "the social construc-
tion of constitutional history," they describe how "disinherited 
groups" "have made aspirations to a life free from legally recog-
nized hierarchies-to a life without the badges and incidents of 
slavery-into a superconstitution that has taken precedence over 
any merely transitory determination of constitutional meaning." 
The effect of this reconstruction of constitutional history, specu-
lates Hendrik Hartog, may be the rejection of "notions of a dis-
tinctly legal or constitutional history, abandoning a perspective 
founded on the American Constitution's separation from the in-
determinacies of American social and political history."4o 
Despite its growing professional acceptance, the trend to-
ward explicitly normative historiography has provoked dissent. 
The constitutional historian Alfred Kelly, after first-hand experi-
ence using history to promote legal reform in the school desegre-
37. Morton J. Horwitz, History and Theory, 96 Yale L.J. 1825, 1830, 1832, 1835 
(1987). 
38. Robert W. Gordon, An Exchange on Critical Legal Studies between Robert W. 
Gordon and William Nelson, 6 Law & Hist. Rev. 139, 181-82 (1988). 
39. Robert W. Gordon, The Politics of Legal History and the Search for a Usable 
Past, 4 Benchmark 269, 280 (1990). 
40. Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and 'The Rights That Belong to 
Us All', 74 J. Amer. Hist. 1013, 1024, 1029 (1987). 
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gation cases, condemned the types of history found in 
constitutional adjudication. This consisted of a priori history, 
created by judicial fiat, and law-office history aimed at selection 
of data favorable to a position. Questioning whether court-ori-
ented history and scholarly history were reconcilable, Kelly held 
that truth in history was independent of its usefulness.41 Simi-
larly Charles Miller, though fully sensitive to the normative use 
of history to transmit values, cautioned against reliance on ideo-
logically charged "ongoing" history by the Supreme Court. 
Miller declared: "The Supreme Court as a whole cannot indulge 
in historical fabrication without thereby appearing to approve 
the deterioration of truth as a criterion for collll!lunication in 
public affairs. . . . where it matters most to society, it matters 
most that the story be a true one."4z 
A recent convert to nontheoretical, objective history is Wil-
liam Nelson, who concedes the failure of his own efforts to show 
the utility of legal history in contemporary legal analysis. Criti-
cizing the normative-theoretical bent of both the original-intent 
school and the critical legal studies movement, he appeals to a 
pure, genuinely historical inquiry that studies the past for its own 
sake.43 Michael Les Benedict similarly sees a clear distinction 
between genuine historical inquiry and legal scholarship that uses 
historical materials. The legal scholar is committed to settling a 
policy question and uses judicially tested rules of evidence to 
evaluate evidence. The historian seeks to explain change over 
time, showing how events occurred to produce the present state 
of affairs. Benedict observes further that legal scholarship using 
history tends toward advocacy, while historical inquiry eschews 
judgment and accepts ambiguities in the evidence. It does not 
force the evidence to yield a definite conclusion.44 
Benedict's historiographical analysis may be more heuristic 
than empirical. While disavowing a normative task for history, 
he himself employs theoretical premises. Historians assume, he 
tells us, that historical actors do not have firm intentions and 
clear understandings about events they are involved in. Histori-
ans assume further that understandings will change over time 
and intentions will go awry.4s Benedict's "historical principles of 
41. Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1%5 Sup. Ct. Rev. 
119, 122, 157. 
42. Miller, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History at 195-% (cited in note 2). 
43. Nelson, 4 Benchmark at 284-91 (cited in note 33). 
44. Michael Les Benedict, Book Review, 10 Law & Hist. Rev. 378, 379-80 (1992). 
45. Id. at 380. 
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analysis" implicate a philosophy of history that is no less impor-
tant for being presented in a theoretically modest way. 
III 
If it is hard to disentangle history from philosophy, it is 
equally difficult to extricate theory from the toils of history. At 
first glance the pursuit of legal theory, in its eager embrace of 
moral philosophy, seems remote from the pedestrian factuality of 
history. History must nevertheless be taken into account, for 
constitutional and legal theorists recognize that their normative 
arguments will gain in persuasiveness if supported by evidence of 
the actual experience of human thought and action in the past. 
Theory, including political science, is integral to American 
constitutionalism. At the start of the twentieth century constitu-
tional theory became preoccupied with the justification of judi-
cial review, the famous "countermajoritarian difficulty" which 
inspired a rich body of criticism through the 1960s.46 In the past 
two decades constitutional theorizing has assumed a new level of 
urgency. This is in large part a response to the historicist chal-
lenge to judicial activism thrown down by the proponents of orig-
inal intent jurisprudence. William Wiecek notes that the 
coherence of constitutional theory disintegrated in the 1980s as 
debate focused on the Framers' intent and the use of history in 
constitutional adjudication.47 The fight over the Bork nomina-
tion in 1987 signified fundamental conflict over constitutional 
philosophy and theory.48 
The varieties of constitutional theory can be bewildering.49 
For present purposes it is sufficient to note the basic distinction 
between those who appeal to the Constitution as an authoritative 
historical document having a substantially fixed, objective mean-
ing, and those who conceive of the Constitution as a text of 
largely symbolic import that enables interpreters to appeal else-
where for authority to decide constitutional questions. We shall 
46. Robert Lowry Clinton, Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review (U. Press of 
Kansas, 1989). 
47. William M. Wiecek, Liberty Under Law: The Supreme Court in American Life 2, 
190 (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1988). 
48. Goldstein, In Defense of the Text at 1 (cited in note 26). 
49. Goldstein enumerates the following theories: intentionalism and textualism 
(often considered as a single theory under the name of originalism or interpretivism); 
extratextualism (also called fundamental values jurisprudence or noninterpretivism); in-
determinacy; and Dworkinism. Id. at 2. Lief Carter identifies interpretivism (which he 
calls preservatism), and political and normative alternatives to interpretivism. Lief H. 
Carter, Contemporary Constitutional Lawmaking: The Supreme Court and the Art of Poli-
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note the response of representative theorists on both sides of this 
distinction to the fundamental requirement that history be taken 
into account in constitutional interpretation. 
Radical historicism figures prominently in the writing of sev-
eral theorists who adopt the second of these views, and who can 
be considered in the "fundamental values" school. The defining 
feature of radical historicism is the idea that the Constitution, 
although it has a history, never has a historical meaning, but al-
ways and only a current meaning. 
In the theory of Ronald Dworkin, for example, law is the 
rights and duties that flow from past collective decisions. Judges 
are not required, however, to understand the law they enforce as 
continuous and consistent in principle with the law of the past. 
"Law as integrity," he explains, "begins in the present and pur-
sues the past only so far as and in the way its contemporary focus 
dictates." It does not aim to recapture the ideals or practical pur-
poses of those who created it.so Hercules, Dworkin's fabled 
judge-interpreter, seeks in statutory and constitutional construc-
tion "to make the best he can of this continuing story [i.e. the life 
of the statute or constitution], and his interpretation therefore 
changes as the story develops." Making the story the best it can 
be, Hercules "interprets history in motion."sl Dworkin rejects 
the historical approach of original intent interpretivism because 
it makes the Framers' mental state decisive in reading the ab-
stract language of the Constitution. It thus denies that the Con-
stitution expresses principles. Asserting that constitutional 
principles do not stop "where some historical statesman's time, 
imagination, and interest stopped," Dworkin avows a "thought-
ful" historicism that retrieves the Framers' abstract convictions 
and asks how they can be best understood in contemporary 
terms.sz 
David Richards argues similarly that legal interpretation is a 
form of historical reconstruction by which a community under-
stands itself as a legal tradition. According to Richards, sound 
legal interpretation requires critical historiography, in contrast to 
the providential and mythical history often found in legal argu-
ments. Richards attacks Raoul Berger's original intent histori-
cism as an abuse of critical historiography because it does not fit 
the available data. Berger's history is flawed as a theory of inter-
pretation because it identifies the meaning of the Constitution 
50. Dworkin, Law's Empire at 227 (cited in note 24). 
51. Id. at 348, 350. 
52. Id. at 369, 361. 
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with the Framers' subjective intent. It is also inadequate as polit-
ical theory because it rests on an indefensible notion of popular 
sovereignty.s3 Richards advocates a type of historical reconstruc-
tion in which the facts bearing on the central texts of the legal 
tradition are used to provide the best theory of the values consti-
tuting the tradition.s4 "[G]ood legal interpretation," he declares, 
"requires that history and moral philosophy be practiced to-
gether."ss But in Richards's scheme the meaning of a political 
theory or constitutional principle is never something objective to 
be discovered in the past; it is a contemporary philosophical con-
ception. He concludes that constitutional interpretation is best 
understood "as the imputation of reasonable purposes to the text 
and history of the Constitution."s6 
A different concept of history operates in the theory of con-
stitutional aspiration. As seen in the writings of Sotirios Barber 
and Walter Murphy, this historical understanding is substantially 
different from radical historicism in a philosophical sense, 
although in programmatic terms the difference may be only 
slight. Barber's theory of aspirational constitutionalism rests on 
the proposition that the Constitution has a meaning-in the past, 
presumably, as well as in the present-that is independent of 
what any interpreter might want it to mean.s7 Affirming natural 
law principles, Barber rejects the relativist position, which denies 
this independent meaning and holds that a constitutional princi-
ple means different things at different times. Historical relativ-
ism cannot comprehend the Constitution as supreme law, a 
concept that assumes some values are fundamental and transhis-
toricai.ss At the same time, Barber avoids the pole of positivistic 
conventionalism. He argues that the Constitution embodies the 
nation's traditions, not simply its history in the sense of the indis-
criminate past. Tradition in this view is different from the past. 
It is a normative theory of what we stand for and what has been 
best in us as a people.59 
Aspirational historicism rejects original intent historicism, 
with its focus on a single, discoverable intent and the specific 
53. David A.J. Richards, Interpretation and Historiography, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 490, 
512, 505, 509 (1985). 
54. Id. at 501. 
55. Id. at 548. 
56. Id. at 527. For a concise statement of the epistemological theory of radical his-
toricism, see Gregory Leyh, Toward a Constitutional Hermeneutics, 32 Amer. J. Pol. Sci. 
369 (1988). 
57. Barber, On What the Constitution Means at 7 (cited in note 24). 
58. Id. at 36. 
59. Id. at 84-85. 
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ideas of the Framers as the key to understanding the meaning of 
constitutional principles.60 Aspirational theorists nevertheless 
recognize the significance of empirical research and find exam-
ples of constitutional aspiration in history.61 The work of Walter 
Murphy has been described as a natural law theory, built largely 
out of historical materials of law and politics in action, that finds 
a coherent vision of the lessons of constitutional history.6z 
A more astringent theory of constitutional aspiration seeks 
to recover the meaning of constitutional principles as the Fram-
ers understood them. In this historical outlook, constitutional 
concepts are not merely symbolic abstractions that permit 
boundless interpretive possibilities for those who would improve 
on the work of the Founders.63 Gary Jacobsohn, for example, 
holds that the Constitution embodies our aspirations, but he re-
jects the idea that to be supreme it must always be "reaffirmed as 
descriptive of our best current conception of an ideal state of af-
fairs."64 Analyzing Lincoln's statesmanship as the preeminent 
example of constitutional aspiration, Jacobsohn emphasizes Lin-
coln's interpretation of the Constitution in relation to the moral 
theory of the Founders. "Only in the framework of this particu-
lar association," he reasons, "may the Constitution be under-
stood to embody the nation's aspirations."6s Rejecting both the 
undisciplined subjectivism of unwritten constitutionalism and the 
parsimonious positivism of original-intent historicism, Jacobsohn 
understands the Constitution as "flow[ing] out of a coherent and 
knowable, not arbitrary or ever-mutable, set of philosophic 
presuppositions. "66 
The theoretical writing of Hadley Arkes further illustrates 
what we may refer to as a nonhistoricist historical inquiry aimed 
at understanding constitutional principles as the Framers under-
stood them.67 According to Arkes, in order to defend, justify, 
and preserve the Constitution it is necessary to establish its es-
60. Walter F. Murphy, Constitutional Interpretation: The Art of the Historian, Magi-
cian, or Statesman?, 87 Yale L.J. 1752, 1764 (1978). 
61. Barber, 3 Stud. Amer. Pol. Dev. at 68 (cited in note 21). 
62. Carter, Contemporary Constitutional Lawmaking at 123, 125-26 (cited in note 
49). See Walter F. Murphy et al., American Constitutional Interpretation (Foundation 
Press, 1986). 
63. Gary J. Jacobsohn, The Supreme Court and the Decline of Constitutional Aspira-
tion 95 (Rowman & Littlefield, 1986). 
64. Id. at 96. The quoted material and view criticized are those of Sotirios A. 
Barber. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 75. 
67. The idea and the necessity of nonhistoricist historical inquiry is discussed in Leo 
Strauss, Natural Right and History 33-34 (U. of Chi. Press, 1953). 
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sential character or meaning. This is not a historicist meaning 
that changes with the passing generations; it is a philosophical 
meaning and moral understanding, grounded in modern natural 
rights theory, that can be grasped again. "To restore those under-
standings is not to engage in a quaint project in 'historical' recon-
struction," Arkes observes. It is a task of philosophical recovery 
and reflection on principles that have a timeless historical exist-
ence. The purpose of this type of inquiry, Arkes writes, is "to 
recall the arguments of the Founders themselves in order to re-
store" their original understanding that "it was necessary to 
move ... beyond the text of the Constitution to the principles of 
right and wrong that stood antecedent to the Constitution."6s 
Arkes proposes "to state anew, and perhaps state more fully, the 
issues that were raised" in the debate over the Constitution and 
the Bill of Rights. In order to apply the Constitution in practical 
cases and preserve and perfect constitutional government, he de-
clares, "[t]here is a need to know again what was known by these 
men."69 
It is generally agreed that the Framers were natural law 
thinkers who relied on modern natural rights theory. Sound his-
torical method, in order to understand the Framers as they un-
derstood themselves, should therefore be open to the possibility 
that philosophical truth or moral reality existsJo This historical 
attitude is disputed by radical historicism on the left (informed 
by pragmatism and cognitive relativism), and by original-intent 
historicism on the right (informed by legal positivism). 
It is ironic that while originalist scholars have forced legal 
theorists to take history into account, they have been somewhat 
reticent about the type of historical thinking that original intent 
jurisprudence requires. The writings of Raoul Berger, the most 
prolific originalist legal historian, appear to rest on the assump-
tion that historical facts are objectively knowable, that the past 
exists independently of the way it is interpreted and does not 
change, and that applying the past to the present is simply a mat-
ter of getting the historical facts straight.71 Whether this ap-
proach to history is sound is not the issue, or at least it is not an 
68. Hadley Arkes, Beyond the Constitution 17-18 (Princeton U. Press, 1990). 
69. Id. at 19-20. 
70. For discussion of this outlook see Michael S. Moore, Do We Have an Unwritten 
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issue that originalist scholars feel obliged to discuss.n Their task 
rather has been to explain in normative terms why constitutional 
original intent, which they assume can be ascertained as readily 
as the purpose or intent of any other historical event or idea, 
should be relied on in constitutional adjudication. 
The reasons for employing original intent include considera-
tions of democratic political theory, the rule of law, neutrality in 
judicial decision-making, and governmental flexibility and re-
sponsiveness. According to Earl Maltz, originalism and original 
intent are labels for a set of conventions reflecting a political the-
ory about the judicial function. Maltz argues that modem the-
ory, not traditionalism or an obligation to the past, requires 
fidelity to Framer intent.73 Thus, although original intent think-
ing is in some sense historical by definition, there is an element 
of truth in John Phillip Reid's assertion that original intent juris-
prudence is more accurately seen as a rejection of judicial activ-
ism, rather than "a respect for constitutional meaning discovered 
through the discipline of history."74 
The best known recent work of originalist scholarship, Rob-
ert H. Bork's The Tempting of America,1s presents very little, if 
any, historical evidence that original intent was ever a practical 
and effective method of constitutional adjudication. Bork's the-
ory of judging is not supported by his history, which is a tale of 
judicial legislation from John Marshall to Thurgood Marshall.76 
A more illuminating account written from an original intent 
point of view is Christopher Wolfe's The Rise of Modern Judicial 
ReviewJ? 
Wolfe attempts to show that interpretivism, or constitutional 
interpretation in accordance with the Framers' purpose and in-
tent, was standard judicial practice in the nineteenth century. He 
argues that John Marshall, for example, relied on intrinsic and 
extrinsic sources of intent, with a view toward discovering what 
72. Although this concept of historical method is held in intellectual disrepute 
among theorists of historiography, the practice of historians suggests there may be sub-
stantial truth in it. 
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the Framers meant by the principles they embodied in the Con-
stitution.7s Wolfe's concept of original intent recognizes the role 
of prudence in the performance of the judicial function and is 
different from Berger's and Bork's positivist conception.79 A 
more philosophically precise description would say Wolfe seeks 
to determine the real or intrinsic meaning-as opposed to either 
original or current meaning-of the Constitution.so In the con-
text of the present analysis, however, the important point is 
Wolfe's attempt to demonstrate the possibility of objective con-
stitutional interpretation, as a theoretical matter, by making a 
good-faith effort to be faithful to the Constitution through histor-
ical reenactment of the process of interpretation.st 
To conclude this brief survey we consider a different kind of 
historical reenactment, tending toward radical historicism and re-
calling the legal realism with which we began, that has been pro-
posed by the constitutional theorist Bruce Ackerman. Criticizing 
the ahistorical character of much constitutional theory, Acker-
man urges "a reflective study of the past" to determine "the con-
crete historical processes" that allowed Americans to transform 
moments of passionate political mobilization into lasting legal 
achievement.sz The result of his historical inquiry is the theory of 
dualist democracy, describing how the people at decisive histori-
cal moments amend the Constitution through the practice of con-
stitutional-as opposed to normal-politics. Ackerman claims 
the authority of the Framers for this theory. As they made the 
original Constitution by acting illegally outside the Articles of 
Confederation, so later generations properly emulate them by 
creatively altering the regime (in reality creating new regimes as 
in Reconstruction and the New Deal), through the exercise of 
the de facto amending power inherent in popular sovereignty. In 
the legal realist spirit of Llewellyn and Corwin, Ackerman views 
the Constitution as "a historically rooted tradition of theory and 
practice-an evolving language of politics" and "historical prac-
tice." He evokes their unwritten, political constitutionalism in 
asserting that the basic reality is the radically different govern-
ment Americans have made for themselves, to which the paper 
78. ld. at 49-50. 
79. ld. at 37, 71, 85, 88. 
80. Brubaker, What Constitutes 'this Constitution'? at 37 (cited in note 70). 
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or ceremonial Constitution is adapted.s3 Ackerman's radical his-
toricism convinces him that we are not "rootless epigones of by-
gone eras of constitutional creativity." By rewriting history, the 
constitutional theorist can recover "the distinctive aspirations of 
the American Republic. "84 
History and theory are reciprocally related in American con-
stitutionalism. To assist in realizing the ends of constitutional 
government in the United States, theory must take account of 
history.ss At the same time, the historical knowledge that is es-
sential for maintaining the Constitution has a normative dimen-
sion. This is not to endorse partisan or ideological history, any 
more than to say the purpose of liberal education is political is to 
approve the politicization of the university.s6 As education is 
political in aiming to produce good citizens, so history-like its 
sister discipline political science-has reason to be partial to the 
regime of liberal democracy.87 Of course there is always the risk 
that history and theory will be abused in the service of ideology. 
In constitutional scholarship, no less than in political life gener-
ally, prudence is required in applying the principles and rules 
that constitute and define inquiry in the respective fields. When 
pursued according to rational and objective scholarly standards, 
however, the disciplines of history and theory can enrich each 
other and contribute much to the discipline of constitutionalism. 
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